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  1 GAP BETWEEN LAW AND MORALITY A Project Made By Name- Akanksha Ranjan Roll No- 1508 Class- B.A. LLB Submitted to  –    Dr. Manoranjan Kumar FINAL PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULLFILLMENT OF COURSE JURISPRUDENCE I DURING THE ACADEMIC SESSION 2018-2019 5 th , September, 2018 CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, PATNA    2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would specially like to thank my guide, mentor, Dr. Manoranjan Kumar without whose constant support and guidance this project would have been a distant reality. This work is an outcome of an unparalleled infrastructural support that I have received from Chankaya National Law University, Patna. I owe my deepest gratitude to the library staff of the college. It would never have been possible to complete this study without an untiring support from my family, specially my parents. This study bears testimony to the active encouragement and guidance of a host of friends and well-wishers.  Name-Akanksha Ranjan Roll - 1508  3 INTRODUCTION First published in 1961, legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart constructs a comprehensive argument for his positivist concept of law in The Concept of Law. Hart affirms that his aim is not to conceptualize and prescribe a definition of law, but to 'further the understanding of law, coercion, and morality as different but related social phenomena. Accordingly, Hart underlines three important areas of inquiry: 'How does law differ from and how is it related to orders backed  by threats? How does legal obligation differ from, and how is it related to, moral obligations? What are rules and to what extent is law an affair of rules?' 1  Via this descriptive approach, Hart advances his concept of law by refuting the idea of coercion in Austin's command theory while also providing for the possibility of a positivist separation between what law is and what law ought to be. This second aspect of Hart's theory-the separation thesis has generated notable controversies (particularly, the Fuller-Hart and Dworkin-Hart debates), and arguably remains his most  problematic 2  conceptual premise. Fuller/Dworkin side of the debate on morality and law by providing a further response to Hart's concept of law. Although Hart provides a thorough justification for the reality and desirability of this distinction, his argument is susceptible to additional counter-arguments relating to two logical inconsistencies in his reasoning. First, the concepts of law and morality are necessarily bound provided that Hart yields to his theory of law as a system of rules rather than a system of orders backed by threats. By recognizing the human capacity for moral reason, Hart provides for the moral character of the internal viewpoint. The internal aspect of rules-which distinguishes a rule from a habit-indicates that the ultimate rule of recognition emerges from this internal viewpoint as a first step from the  pre-legal into the legal world. 3  Given that the validity of law is an internal statement itself recognizing the rule of recognition, Hart links the validity of law to morality. 1  HLA Hart, The Concept ofLaw (2nd edn, OUP 1997) vi. 2  HLA Hart, 'Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals' (1958) 71:4 Harvard Law Review 593. 3  Hart, Concept of Law (n 1) 56, 94  4 Second, requirements under the primary rules of obligation conflict with Hart's concept of a law too iniquitous to obey. These contradictory assertions necessarily provide for the moral nature of law as a system of rules. To begin, I will describe and assess Hart's concept of law in the following section. I will then  provide a more detailed analysis of the logical inconsistencies in Hart's theory in order to bridge the conceptual gap between law and morality. It is crucial to note that this response does not assume that morality includes 'all sorts of extra-legal notions about 'what ought to be,' regardless of their sources, pretensions, or intrinsic worth.' 4  Moral values are best understood as those governing interpersonal relations in a way that prevents the instrumentalization of others, and upholds for them a standard of treatment that one would wish for oneself. Furthermore, I acknowledge that moral and legal rules are distinct, and that both the obligations they impose and the sanctions they warrant differ. 5  However, this distinction does not itself provide for the separation of law and morality; a necessary connection does not imply that all moral rules are law, but merely requires that all legal rules conform to moral values - i.e., that valid law cannot be immoral. 4   Lon L Fuller, 'Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart' (1958) 71:4 Harvard Law Review 630, 635. 5  Hart, Concept of Law (n 1) 86. Hart's assessment of law and morality generally focuses on the distinction between moral and legal obligations in order to defend the separation thesis.  
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